“Christopher Snedden’s lucidly written and well-researched book engages with the fraught question of the Kashmiri demand for independence for and over which so many have died over the decades. He traces its history, what it has meant to the various parties involved in defining, enabling and thwarting it, and is clear-eyed in presenting both the possibilities and impediments to its realization. The conclusions Snedden reaches may not please everyone but will certainly provoke thought and, in prompting debate, will ensure the question is not closed and forgotten about.”
—Mridu Rai, Professor of History, Presidency University, Kolkata
“In a work that is bound to be fiercely debated, Snedden undertakes a challenging journey through the complexities of Kashmiri identity, the elusive concept of “azadi,” and the uncertainties surrounding the combination of the two.”
—Rajesh Basrur, Visiting Professor, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore and author of Rising India: Status and Power
“A thought-provoking exploration of Kashmiris' aspirations for independence (in different forms) over time, of the historic circumstances that helped to create this situation and of the one thing on which India and Pakistan agree - that it must not happen.”
—Gareth Price, Senior Research Fellow, Chatham House
“A masterly account of the demand for independence in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Drawing upon extensive primary sources, Christopher Snedden explains how the struggle - rooted primarily in the Kashmir valley - originated centuries ago because of the region's unique location and cultural history, and why it remains a mirage.”
—Victoria Schofield, biographer, historian, author of Kashmir in Conflict, India, Pakistan and the Unending War
“Snedden’s Independent Kashmir weaves a highly complex and layered narrative around the region’s tumultuous history, building a convincing argument for why the independentist emotions remain deeply entrenched into the political, social and cultural fabric of Kashmir, and explaining why these aspirations could never materialise.”
—Shakir Mir, Kashmir Times
“This is the third book on J&K by Christopher Snedden, an Australian political scientist. The earlier two were The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir (2012) and Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris (2017). He now returns to the theme to explore why the concept of an independent Kashmir ‘remains incomplete’. This book was originally published in 2021; the Indian edition is of 2025.Snedden says he was motivated to write this book to investigate the concept of an independent J&K as suggested in 1947-48; understand the Kashmiri identity and centrality; and understand what exactly azadi means to them—integration with India, Pakistan, or independence. In seven chapters, he elaborates on the options opened up by the decolonization process; Maharaja Hari Singh’s persona and actions; territoriality, identity and nationalism of the Kashmiris; the rise of Sheikh Abdullah as a major political figure; his sway and downfall; the Sheikh’s wavering political postures; and finally, the post-1988 developments and their implications for azadi.This is a well researched book even if most of the material is already in the public domain. There is much to recall, even relish. One instance: in 1924, Maharaja Hari Singh spent a million pounds on racing in Europe; he paid out three hundred thousand pounds to a British prostitute as ‘hush’ money. In 1925, the British elevated him as the ruler of J&K.The documentation enables us to refresh memories regarding the lingering strand of independence of J&K.Contiguity, communications and commerce all suggested J&K’s accession to Pakistan. To Jinnah, J&K was ‘in my pocket’; ‘it would fall like a ripe fruit’ in Pakistan’s lap. This optimism survived despite Jinnah’s unsuccessful attempts to meet the Maharaja during any of his three pre-Partition visits to the Valley. Mountbatten, according to his biographer Zeigler whom the author cites, was ‘trying to ensure the Maharaja acceded to Pakistan’. The Congress and Nehru seemed reconciled to this eventuality though with sadness and wishing otherwise.Sheikh Abdullah had observed that J&K did enjoy independence for 72 days—from 15 August to 26 October 1947—during the period between I-Day and deposit of the Instrument of Accession. But if that is to be used as the basis to validate or justify the cause of independence, other large Princely States—Jodhpur and Bhopal, among others—who deposited the Instruments even later would have had stronger claims to demand independence. They never did.India itself bears responsibility for introducing the prospect of independence. The accession of J&K was treated differently when the Instrument was deposited. The Indian Defence Committee decided on 27 October 1947 to ‘offer a reference to the people’ when accepting the Instrument of Accession with three choices to ‘join India, Pakistan or remain independent’. Nehru said India would not mind J&K remaining independent ‘provided that it was within India’s sphere of influence’. The insertion of Article 370 brought in a constitutional guarantee of separateness.The ‘reference to the people’ can be attributed to the contemporary democratic impulse. The same was offered to Junagarh which was the reverse case: a Muslim ruler with a predominantly Hindu population. In J&K, Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference heralded the democratic forces and strongly favoured joining the Indian Union; the rival Muslim Conference favoured Pakistan but was a much weaker political and popular entity.The independence option may well have been inspired by realpolitik—keeping J&K out of Pakistan. There was expectation, even faith, that the democratic process under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah would endorse the Indian option. This Indian conviction—misplaced in retrospect? —led to the three options formula being reiterated in the UNSC by N Gopalaswami Ayyangar in January 1948 making it, thereby an international commitment. He further held out the possibility of J&K joining the UN should it choose to remain independent.This was an obvious contravention of the India Independence Act which provided for the creation of only two Dominions—India and Pakistan. It was in violation of the positions taken by the Congress till then. It militated against the repeated pronouncements of the British leaders, including Mountbatten, that with the lapse of paramountcy, Princely States could only join one or the other dominion. There would be no third option; they could not aspire to dominion status nor join the Commonwealth.The irony, as the author notes, was that it was unnecessary. The decolonization process ensured that the accession of the Maharaja would be ‘final and absolute’. It was consistent with Jinnah’s position that the ruler alone was the decision-maker; the ‘will of the people’ was not relevant. That may not have prevented Pakistan from taking the issue to the UN. But the case then would have been different; it could not have been of ‘disputed’ territory.In 1952, Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah seriously discussed the independence of J&K with Nehru writing a Note titled the ‘Impracticability of an Independent Kashmir’ in which he termed it ‘inconceivable’; even the limited Kashmiri speaking territory including the Valley and adjacent areas would be a small state ‘politically and economically unviable’, ‘completely unworkable’. The ‘quantum of autonomy’ could be discussed but he could not ‘imagine an independent Kashmir’. ‘He would rather give Kashmir on a platter’ to Pakistan.Sheikh Abdullah had not supported the decision to go to the UN. It formalized Pakistan as a litigant in the dispute. In 1948 itself, he was convinced that the powers that be were uninterested in resolving the issue. He had concluded, even if unwillingly, that it was beyond the capabilities of the UN to find a ‘just solution to Kashmir issue’.The author says the ‘dispute’ is not so much about J&K as the control of the Valley. In 1949, Nehru had written to Patel that ‘the prize we were fighting for is the Valley’; Jammu was anyway inclined to be with India.India and Pakistan, even the UN, agreed that Kashmir/J&K cannot be independent. There was a more intrinsic problem. The author says, ‘the concept of an independent J&K has never been clearly articulated’. He found only two documents of the J&K State People’s Convention (1969) and a JKLF Roadmap (2003) —‘both rudimentary’—and P N Bazaz’s book (The Paradoxes of Kashmir, 1951) which indicates that no ‘sustained political thought or effort had been put into securing an independent J&K.’ Thus, securing an independent J&K ‘will be difficult’. ‘This concept can be dismissed as a possibility.’However, the author says, an ‘independent Kashmir is another matter’ and ‘might be one way to resolve the issue’. The Valley is the only region where people are disenchanted and being ‘free from Indian control’ ‘may now be an entrenched Kashmiri attitude’. It might solve the ‘dispute’ between India and Pakistan and create a ‘win-win’ situation. As had been suggested back in 1949, this would ensure neither India nor Pakistan would have control of the Valley; they would have nothing to squabble about. ‘The establishment of an independent Kashmir might, therefore, be a good idea.’ It would satisfy the ‘J&K-ites’—an amorphous lot lacking clear definition even in geographical terms but who might possibly constitute a portion of the Valley Muslims.It will, however, be a ‘great challenge’ giving their own lack of clarity regarding their goal of azadi; internal disunity; absence of a leader with ‘vision, capabilities and charisma’ ‘like Gandhi or Mao’; lack of a coherent ‘liberation strategy or ideology’. Successive Indian governments have ‘prevented such a leader from emerging or operating’ by ‘detaining dissident Kashmiris, actual or potential’. The presence of massive security forces ensures this. The Government and the Army have made it clear that independence will never happen.Kashmir, the author says, is an ‘open air prison’ with ‘caged’ Kashmiris now possibly having an ‘entrenched siege mentality’. Despite their uncertainties, the ‘clearest part of their aspirations for azadi seems to be that they want India to leave the Valley’. ‘Overwhelmingly’ therefore, azadi now appears to mean ‘freedom from India’ not ‘for independence’.For the Indian Government, he says, the challenges are to accommodate the unique identity of the Kashmiris (one might justifiably ask: don’t the people of every Indian State have their own unique identity?) and make them renounce anti-India sentiments of their own volition. A ‘serious dialogue’, ‘consultation’ would be a start.Snedden concludes: India is ‘most likely’ to retain Kashmir. Pakistan lacks the capability to ‘eject’ India but will continue to create problems. Neither has a ‘compelling need’ to resolve the dispute. Nor is there interest or pressure on either nation, domestically or internationally, for resolution. It is accepted as a ‘bilateral’ matter. J&K is a ‘tepid backwater’ with the potential to ‘boil over’ at any time.Having marshalled all the evidence, the author switches roles from a political scientist to a soothsayer. He speculates, indeed forecasts, that just as South Asian history and, along with it, borders have undergone periodic changes over the centuries, some ‘unexpected, unanticipated’ development(s), a ‘Black Swan’ event would shatter the status quo. The time frame is unspecified, yet he hopes to see it ‘in my lifetime’. The dire prophecy: If the Kashmiris are determined to unify, strategize, get lucky, they might succeed and finally win their independence. Followed by the pusillanimous cop out: ‘it is only a suggestion not a guarantee’.The author says the book was written in July 2020 (p. 316). Much has happened since then including the Supreme Court’s validation, in December 2023, of the abrogation of Article 370; peaceful elections in September/October 2024 to the 90-member Assembly in which 70% of the population voted, resulting in the formation of a National Conference government with 42 seats and the BJP winning 29 seats.J&K continues to be ruled by Kashmiris since accession. The reader is left wondering whether this well researched and documented book would not have gained credibility in the absence of the author’s prognostications.”
—TCA Rangachari is former diplomat and former Director of the Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, The Book Review, Volume XLIX Number 6 June 2025